An agent based business aware incident detection system for cloud environments by Frank Doelitzscher et al.
Doelitzscher et al. Journal of Cloud Computing: Advances, Systems and Applications 2012, 1:9
http://www.journalofcloudcomputing.com/content/1/1/9
RESEARCH Open Access
An agent based business aware incident
detection system for cloud environments
Frank Doelitzscher1*, Christoph Reich1, Martin Knahl1, Alexander Passfall1 and Nathan Clarke2
Abstract
Classic intrusion detection mechanisms are not ﬂexible enough to cope with cloud speciﬁc characteristics such as
frequent infrastructure changes. This makes them unable to address new cloud speciﬁc security issues. In this paper
we introduce the cloud incident detection system Security Audit as a Service (SAaaS). It is built upon intelligent
autonomous agents, which are aware of underlying business driven intercommunication of cloud services. This
enables the presented SAaaS architecture to be ﬂexible and to supported cross customer event monitoring within a
cloud infrastructure. A contribution of this paper it to provide a high-level design of the SAaaS architecture, an
introduction into the proposed Security Business Flow Language (SBFL), a ﬁrst prototype of an autonomous agent
and an evaluation about, which cloud speciﬁc security problems are addressed by the presented architecture. It is
shown that autonomous agents and behaviour analysis are fertile approaches to detect cloud speciﬁc security
problems and can create a cloud audit system.
Keywords: Cloud security, Cloud audit, Agents
Introduction
Enterprise analysts and research have identiﬁed cloud
speciﬁc security problems as the major research area
in cloud computing [1-4]. Since security is still a com-
petitive challenge for classic IT environments it is even
more for cloud environments due to its characteristics,
like seamless scalability, shared resources, multi-tenancy,
access from everywhere, on-demand availability and 3rd
party hosting [5]. Pushed by cloud commercials promising
“inﬁnite scalability and resources” combined with on-
demand access from everywhere, cloud user quickly forget
that there is still a real IT infrastructure behind a cloud,
where the architecture complexity is actually increased
compared to traditional data centers. This also intro-
duces security and availability issues as recent incidents
at the major public cloud provider Amazon Web Services
(AWS) show. After an infrastructure outage in April 2011,
Amazon’s Compute Cloud EC2 was not available, caus-
ing popular services like Reddit to be unable to serve
its customers [6]. While such an outage violates EC2’s
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quality of service level agreements of 99.95% availability:
(=ˆ 1,825 outage days/year), Amazon’s support handling
had a strong impact on trust in current cloud provider:
(1) Amazon data centers are divided into several
availability zones to distribute impact of (hardware)
failures. For resilience reasons users distribute their
data over diﬀerent availability zones. As a result of
the outage EC2 customers permanently lost data,
although services were hosted on diﬀerent EC2
availability zones. A company oﬀering webservice
usage monitoring lost 11 hours of historical data [7].
(2) During the crash an EC2 customer running a
monitoring service of cardiac patients tried to reach
Amazon’s support unsuccessfully. Neither
information about the expected downtime nor
moving the unreachable instances to a diﬀerent EC2
data center was oﬀered.
(3) Since hardware sovereignty is given away in cloud
computing security, health and monitoring
information is critical to cloud users to build there
services in an appropriate way regardless which
cloud model (public, hybrid, private cloud) is used.
This is already known from traditional IT
outsourcing and providers try to establish trust to
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customers by proving their compliance to IT security
standards like ISO27001 or ISO9001. Amazon AWS
so far seams to follow a contrary approach: although
AWS provides status information about the cloud
infrastructure at the Amazon Service Health
Dashboard [8] users can only see a service’ history
over the last ﬁve weeks. Amazons problems from
April 2011 were not visible anymore to users by the
end of May 2011, as depicted in Figure 1.
Although existing recommendations (ITIL), standards
(ISO 27001:5, CobiT, PCIDSS) and laws (e.g., Germanys
Federal Data Protection Act) provide well-established
security and privacy rulesets for data center providers,
research has shown that additional regulations have to be
deﬁned for cloud environments [1,9]. In classic IT infras-
tructures security audits and penetration tests are used
to document a data center’s compliance to security best
practices or laws. But, the major shortcoming of a tra-
ditional security audit is that it only provides a snapshot
of an environments’ security state at a given time (time
of the audit was performed). This is adequate since clas-
sic IT infrastructures don’t change that frequently. But,
because of the mentioned cloud characteristics above, this
is not suﬃcient for auditing a cloud environment. A cloud
audit needs to consider the point of time when the infras-
tructure changes and the ability to decide if this change
is not causing a security gap or an infrastructure misuse.
Knowledge of underlying business processes is needed, for
example, to decide if a cloud service scales up because of
a higher demand of valid business requests or a hacker
misuse. As a ﬁrst approach to a continuous auditing sys-
tem for cloud environments we are presenting a cloud
monitoring environment in this paper.
While monitoring the security of large IT infrastruc-
tures with distributed sensors as input feeds is common
for Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) this approach
breaks down for cloud infrastructures. Mainly, because
of the complexity and frequently changing environment
driven by the user. Traditional IDS setups are built around
a single monolithic entity, which is not adaptive enough
to do data collection and processing in an eﬃcient and
meaningful way [10]. To mitigate this we propose an
incident detection system for cloud computing: Security
Audit as a Service (SAaaS), which is build upon intelli-
gent, autonomous agents collecting data directly at the
source, analyze and aggregate information and distribute
it considering the underlying business process. This data
interpretation is achieved using a Security Business Flow
modelling engine that allows to model security monitor-
ing events which are aware of an underlying business
ﬂow. The usage of autonomous agents enables a behaviour
anomaly detection of cloud components while maintain-
ing the cloud’s speciﬁc ﬂexibility. Our system respects the
following cloud speciﬁc attributes:
• A high number and complexity of distributed systems
• An often changing infrastructure (e.g., service
scalability or user driven)
• A business process driven intercommunication of
cloud service
• Cloudwide incident detection
In the remainder of this paper, we ﬁrst describe related
work (Section Related work). Continuing with selected
cloud speciﬁc security issues (Section Cloud speciﬁc secu-
rity issues in focus), which are targeted by our approach.
(Section SAaaS architecture) then introduces the Security
Audit as a Service (SAaaS) architecture. The concept of
using a distributed agent framework is introduced and a
ﬁrst agent prototype is shown. (Section Framework evalu-
ation) evaluates why the paradigm of autonomous agents
is valuable for incident detection in cloud environments
and how the presented SAaaS architecture addresses the
Figure 1 Amazon Health Dashboard accessed at 05/25/2011 and 05/31/2011.
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presented cloud security issues. (Section Conclusion and
future work) concludes the paper and informs about
future work.
Related work
First, current literature identifying cloud security issues
is shown, followed by a presentation of other cloud audit
projects. Then some related work about using behaviour
detection to perform anomaly detection gets presented.
This section then continues with a discussion about other
cloud security research projects in contrast to SAaaS. It
ends with an overview of selected other research regard-
ing the usage of autonomous agents to overcome tradi-
tional monitoring system limitations.
Cloud security literature
The most comprehensive survey about current litera-
ture addressing cloud security issues is given by Vaquero
et al. in [3]. It categorizes the most widely accepted
cloud security issues into three diﬀerent domains of the
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) model: machine virtu-
alization, network virtualization and physical domain. It
also proposes prevention frameworks on several architec-
tural levels to address the identiﬁed issues. While Chen
et al. state in [4] that many IaaS-related cloud security
problems are problems of traditional computing solved
by presented technology frameworks it also demands an
architecture that enables “mutual trust” for cloud user and
cloud provider. Both papers conﬁrm and complete the
cloud speciﬁc security issues identiﬁed by our research.
Furthermore, they identiﬁed a demand of a two-way trust
enabling architecture for cloud infrastructures and the
ability of “selectable security primitives with well consid-
ered defaults” [4]. The SAaaS architecture will provide
this mutual trust. SAaaS’ Security Business Flow Lan-
guage enables the user to deﬁne its own security levels
and to choose from a spectrum of security subsystems as
demanded by [4].
Cloud audit research projects
Wang et al. present in [11] a system to audit integrity and
security of public data cloud storage. Their solution allows
a third party auditor to be able to eﬃciently audit the cloud
data storage without demanding the local copy of data,
and introduce no additional on-line burden to the cloud
user. Therefore they combine the public key based homo-
morphic authenticator with random masking to achieve a
privacy-preserving public cloud data auditing system.
A “Dynamic Audit Services for Outsourced Storages in
Clouds” is presented by Zhu et al in [12]. The approach
uses fragment structures, random sampling and index-
hash tables, supporting provable updates to outsourced
data and timely anomaly detection.
Massonett et al. discuss in [13] the problem for IT secu-
rity audits if federated cloud infrastructures are spanned
across diﬀerent countries. They introduce an existing fed-
erated Cloud monitoring infrastructure to monitor in
which country data is actually saved without compromis-
ing Cloud isolation. In the presented approach collabora-
tion is required between the cloud infrastructure provider
and the user of the cloud, the service provider. The pro-
posed architecture is validated by an e-Government case
study with legal data location constraints.
Cloud audit standardization projects
To address the lack of existing standards regarding cloud
speciﬁc security problems, a couple of open projects have
been created. One working group of the Cloud Security
Alliance (CSA) is the umbrella project Governance, Risk
Management and Compliance (CSR) [14]. It includes the
sub projects CloudAudit, Cloud Controls Matrix (CCM),
Consensus Assessments Initiative Questionnaire (CAIQ)
and Cloud Trust Protocol (CTP). The Cloud Audit A6 -
Automated Audit, Assertion, Assessment and Assurance
API [15] has the goal to provide a common interface
and namespace for cloud computing providers to auto-
mate the audit, assertion, assessment, and assurance of
their cloud environments. The Cloud Controls Matrix
“is speciﬁcally designed to provide fundamental security
principles to guide cloud vendors and to assist prospective
cloud customers in assessing the overall security risk of a
cloud provider.” [14]. A questionnaire about which secu-
rity controls exist in IaaS, PaaS and SaaS oﬀers is provided
by the Consensus Assessments Initiative Questionnaire.
Finally, the CTP is an initiative to create a machine and
human readable protocol which provides Transparency
as a Service for cloud users about compliance of cloud
provider [16].
The EuroCloud Star Audit [17] is a German certiﬁ-
cate for a SaaS cloud provider. The audit aims to estab-
lish a high level of security and transparency for users
and providers alike. The audit starts with the provider’s
general proﬁle, carries on with contract and compliance
including data privacy protection, general security, oper-
ation and infrastructure, operation processes and goes as
far as application and implementation.
Behaviour analysis & anomaly detection
Nascimento and Correia [18] describe a system for ﬁnding
anomalies in HTTP requests which can also be applied to
HTTP services running as SaaS. They compare diﬀerent
algorithms of which most are based on analyzing string
tuples of diﬀerent lengths.
A good introduction to anomaly detection is given by
Banerjee et al. in [19]. Starting with anomaly detection
in general and its applications, they later go into detail
about various algorithms. The work is ﬁnished with a case
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study of anomaly detection in network intrusion detection
where the authors present a system in use at University
of Minnesota which in the past successfully detected var-
ious network anomalies undetected by SNORT like new
worms or very slow network scans.
Lazarevic et al. [20], Garca-Teodoro et al. [21] and
Patcha and Park [22] provide overviews over diﬀerent
anomaly detection techniques for intrusion detection.
They all discuss advantages and drawbacks of various
approaches, each focusing on a diﬀerent subset. Lazarevic
et al. compare diﬀerent outlier detection techniques using
distance-based methods like local outlier factor, near-
est neighbor of unsupervised support vector machines.
The algorithms are benchmarked using the 1998 DARPA
Intrusion Detection Evaluation Data where the former
scores the best results.
Roschke et al. [23] propose an intrusion detection sys-
tem for cloud computing where each layer (SaaS, PaaS,
IaaS) has its own detection system. The System also
includes an anomaly detection part which is, however, not
the focus of the paper and has to be detailed in future
work.
Another IDS for cloud computing is described by Vieira
et al. [24].
Similar cloud security research to SAaaS
Raj et al. [25] introduce a virtualization service imple-
mented as Xen Virtual Machine (VM) extensions, which
provides role based access control based on a trust value
of a VM. This trust is based upon a VM’s attributes,
like number of open network connections. Access to dif-
ferent cloud services, like ﬁle access is given on a VM’s
trust value. The presented implementation methods are
following the same idea as the SAaaS architecture: trust
generation via behavioural monitoring to build a “nor-
mal” cloud usage proﬁle. The implementation presented is
mainly based on Xen tools. Since SAaaS is build upon the
CloudIA infrastructure, which uses KVM, corresponding
tools need to be identiﬁed/implemented. The presented
SAaaS architecture will extend this trust model by the
ability to evaluate business process driven cloud infras-
tructure changes due to the presented Security Business
Flow Language.
In [26] Wei et al. present a VM image management sys-
tem, which controls VM image access and tracks image
provenance to address the issue of security patches for
VM base images. It provides a prototype image scanner
to scan software versions installed within a VM image
and ﬁlter for user to exclude images with unpatched
software stacks. To provide secure cloud hosts running
VM images the authors of [3,27] propose the usage of
TPM/TCPA crypt chips for secure OS installation. The
SAaaS architecture can utilize all of the above introduced
techniques to establish a trusted computing base for
cloud environments and extends them to provide a cross
customer trust.
The applicability of using complex event processing
(CEP) in cloud environments is demonstrated by Schaaf et
al. in [28]. The authors present a predictive cloud broker
which reacts to changes in business processes and reﬂects
them in up- or downscaling of cloud resources (VM)s. As
a decision base distributed monitoring instances in rela-
tional database systems are used to feed the CEP engine.
While this approach is an initial step in our direction the
work remains quite high-level and in particular focuses
on business process changes whereas SAaaS targets the
detection of security incidents. Despite these diﬀerent
application areas, principles of this work can be applied to
the SAaaS architecture. It extends them by the consider-
ation of business process ﬂows, and a reduction of event
storms.
Distributed agents research
Intensive fundamental research on the applicability of
autonomous agents and multi-agent systems at diﬀer-
ent areas of research, such as game theory, e-business,
semantic web and distributed computing is done by M.
Wooldridge [29]. Lots of his work is based on agents fol-
lowing the beliefs, desires, and intentions (BDI) model
[30], which results in the intelligence an agent has. The
agent framework proposed in this paper supports the BDI
model and integrates its beneﬁts. The advantages of using
agents to overcome the challenges of monitoring a fre-
quently changing infrastructure is discussed in research
especially in the area of Intrusion Detection & Prevention
Systems (IDS, IPS) and demonstrated in [31-34]. Lui et al.
demonstrate in [31] that anomaly detection can enhance
the detection of new, unknown network attacks in an IDS.
They show that certain data mining algorithms are more
suited to detected certain network attacks than others.
Thereforemultiple agents are proposed implementing dif-
ferent data mining algorithms to lead to a higher, more
precise detection rate of unknown network attacks. This
supports the idea presented in this paper that agents can
enhance anomaly detection of unknown attacks. While
the agents presented by Lui et al. are very static in their
perimeter, the proposed SAaaS agents in our work can
be extended during runtime to adapt better to the cur-
rent infrastructure state. For example, if a cloud user adds
a software to its VM, an existing ﬁle system monitoring
agent conﬁguration can be updated to additionally mon-
itor this speciﬁc path as well. If this case includes the
installation of a second agent on the VM, a local Aggrega-
tor agent will be updated, to accept / collect events from
this new agent as well.
Zamboni et al. present in [35] how traditional Intru-
sion Detection Systems (IDS) can be enhanced by using
autonomous agents. They conﬁrm the advantages of using
Doelitzscher et al. Journal of Cloud Computing: Advances, Systems and Applications 2012, 1:9 Page 5 of 19
http://www.journalofcloudcomputing.com/content/1/1/9
autonomous agents in regards to scalability and system
overlapping security event detection. In contrast to our
SAaaS architecture their research is focusing on the detec-
tion of intrusions into a relatively closed environment
whereas our work applies to an open (cloud) environ-
ment where incidents like abuse of resources needs to
be detected. While Chirumamilla et al. show in [32] that
agents can enhance the security of wireless networks they
don’t really beneﬁt from typical agent characteristics like
deployment on demand as the SAaaS agents presented in
this paper.
Mo et al. introduce in [36] an IDS based on distributed
agents using mobile technology. They show how mobile
agents can support anomaly detection thereby overcom-
ing the ﬂaws of traditional intrusion detection in accu-
racy and performance. The paradigm of cooperating dis-
tributed autonomous agents and its corresponding advan-
tages for IDS’ is also shown by Sengupta et al. in [37]. The
presented advantages apply for our SAaaS agents as well.
Kru¨gel and Toth show in [34] that processing limitations
of IDS can be enhanced by using mobile agents. Instead
of moving sensor information to a central processing unit
they use agents to correlate themonitored event data, thus
increasing fault tolerance and scalability of the intrusion
detection system. This idea is partially supported by the
event preprocessing of the presented SAaaS agents in this
work. This approach will be further investigated during
the SAaaS project lifetime.
Cloud speciﬁc security issues in focus
This section describes cloud speciﬁc problems which
we target by our approach. A detailed analysis of the
actual security impact is not easy to ﬁnd, because very
often security problems are declared as cloud security
problems, although they already exist in traditional IT-
outsourcing scenarios and aremerely exacerbated in cloud
environments. The German Federal Oﬃce for Informa-
tion Security publishes the IT baseline protection cata-
logs enabling enterprises to achieve an appropriate secu-
rity level for all types of information. The catalogs were
extended by a special module covering virtualization in
2010. In a comprehensive study on all IT baseline pro-
tection catalogs as well as current scientiﬁc literature
available ([1-4,38]) we made a comparison between clas-
sic IT-Housing, IT-Outsourcing and cloud computing.
The study is available at [39]. The following cloud spe-
ciﬁc security issues were identiﬁed as auditable by the
SAaaS system. Furthermore, each identiﬁed issue is cat-
egorized by the aﬀected core principles of information
security, such as availability, conﬁdentiality, integrity, etc.,
to provide a starting point for a risk management analysis.
1) Detection of cloud resource abuse Cloud
computing advantages are also used by hackers,
enabling them to have a big amount of computing
power for a relatively decent price, startable in no
time. Cloud infrastructure gets used to crack WPA,
and PGP keys as well as to host malware, trojans,
software exploits used by phishing attacks or to build
botnets, like the Zeus botnet. The main reason lies in
a ’frictionless’ registration process where only a
credit card number is used to ’authenticate’ a
customer. The problem of malicious insiders also
exists in classical IT-Outsourcing but gets ampliﬁed
in cloud computing through the lack of transparency
into provider process and procedure. This issue
aﬀects the following core principles of information
security: authorization, integrity, non-repudiation
and privacy. Strong monitoring of user activities on
all cloud infrastructure components is necessary to
increase transparency.
2) Cloud security transparency Security incidents in
cloud environments occur and (normally) get ﬁxed
by the cloud provider. But, to our best knowledge, no
cloud provider so far provides a system which
informs user promptly if the cloud infrastructure gets
attacked, enabling them to evaluate the risk of
keeping their cloud services productive during the
attack. Thereby the customer must not necessarily be
a victim of the attack, but still might be informed to
decide about the continuity of his running cloud
service. Furthermore, no cloud provider so far shares
information about possible security issues caused by
software running directly on cloud host machines. In
an event of a possible zero day exploit in software
running on cloud hosts (e.g., hypervisor, OS kernel)
cloud customer blindly depend on a working patch
management of the cloud provider. Cloud providers
usually do not disclose information on this processes
to customers. By this issue the information security
core principles textit integrity, availability and
non-repudiation are aﬀected.
3) Recognition of defective shared resources
isolation In cloud computing isolation in depth is
not easily achievable due to usage of rather complex
virtualization technology, like VMware, Xen or KVM.
Persistent storage is shared between customers as
well. Cloud provider advertise implemented reliability
measures to prevent data loss, like replicating data up
to six times. In contrast customers have no
possibility to prove if all these copies get securely
erased in case they quit with the provider and this
storage gets newly assigned to a diﬀerent customer.
While the presented SAaaS architecture does not
directly increase isolation in depth it adds to the
detection of security breaches helping to minimize its
damage by the presented actions. Aﬀected
information security core principles are integrity,
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authenticity, conﬁdentiality, non-repudiation,
availability and possibly data privacy.
SAaaS architecture
In this section, we ﬁrst give an agent deﬁnition and show
how an autonomous agent architecture can improve inci-
dent detection in cloud environments. We then introduce
the SAaaS architecture components and elaborate the
concept of Security Business Flow rules. Following, a ﬁrst
SAaaS agent prototype is presented.
Agent deﬁnition
An agent can be deﬁned as [40]: “... a software entity which
functions continuously and autonomously in a particu-
lar environment ... able to carry out activities in a ﬂexible
and intelligent manner that is responsive to changes in
the environment ... Ideally, an agent that functions con-
tinuously ... would be able to learn from its experience.
In addition, we expect an agent that inhabits an envi-
ronment with other agents and processes to be able to
communicate and cooperate with them ...”
Since the agents in the SAaaS architecture are running
independently, not necessarily connected to a certain cen-
tral instance, are self-defending and self-acting, we term
them autonomous. Agents can receive and send data from
or to other instances, like agents or SAaaS’ event pro-
cessing system. The “central” event processing system gets
itself implemented as an agent, which can be scaled and
distributed over multiple VMs.
How agents can improve incident detection
Incident detection in cloud environments is a non trivial
task due to a cloud’s characteristics:
Reduction of events Especially the frequently changing
infrastructure poses a big challenge to deﬁne something,
like normal behaviour and detect anomalous behaviour.
Therefore it is important to have a high number of sensors
capturing simple events. Simple events need to be pre-
processed and abstracted to complex events, reducing the
possibility “of event storms”.
Fast adaption Combined with knowledge about business
process ﬂows it will be possible to detect security inci-
dents in a frequently changing infrastructure while keep-
ing the network load low. The usage of autonomous acting
agents delivers this possibility.
Flexibility Agents can also be added, removed or recon-
ﬁgurated during runtime without altering other com-
ponents. Thus, the amount of monitoring entities (e.g.,
network connections of a VM, running processes, storage
access, etc.) of a cloud instance can be changed with-
out restarting the incident detection system. Simultane-
ously, using agents can save computing resources since
the underlying business process ﬂow can be taken into
account.
Increased durability Furthermore, using autonomous
agents has advantages in case of a system failure. Agents
can monitor the existence of co-located agents. If an agent
stops for whatever reasons this stays not undetected. Con-
cepts of asymmetric cryptography or Trusted Platform
Module (TPM) technology can be used to guarantee the
integrity of a (re-)started agent. If an agent stops damage
is restricted to this single agent or a small subset of agents
which are requiring information from this agent.
In the following examples are presented to support the
identiﬁed advantages. Imagine a business process of a
web application P1 (depicted in Figure 2) where user Bob
adds a new user to a user database by ﬁlling out a web
Figure 2 Business ﬂow dependend agent deployment.
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form. By pressing the “Save” button a legal request R (1)
gets executed as part of business process P1. Agent A
that monitors the database access gets moved (2) at the
process start R to the request-executing VM(s) V1,V2,
monitoring the data access (3),(5) during process time.
After the data process has been comleted (4), (6) they
delete themselves from V1, V2 after P1 has been ﬁn-
ished. This results in increased ﬂexibility and fast adaption
to a changing infrastructure.
Furthermore, agents can be updated to new versions
(depending their interface remains unchanged) without
restarting the whole incident detection system or other
SAaaS agents running at a VM.
SAaaS agents are enabled to be aware of underlying
business ﬂows (see Section Modelling of business ﬂows).
Therefore several simple agents are logically belonging
together forming an agent groupwhere every agent knows
about the other agent. While single agents monitor sim-
ple events (e.g., user login on a VM) and share them
with the agent group abstract, complex events can be
created. Given the scenario of a successful unauthorized
login of an attacker at a virtual machine VM2, misus-
ing a web server’s directory to deposit malicious content
for instance a trojan. Agent A1 monitors the user login,
agent A2 detects the change of a directory content and
agent A3 detects a download of a unknown ﬁle (the tro-
jan). Instead of sending those three simple messages to
a central event processing unit an Aggregator agent can
collect them, conditioning one abstract event message
that VM2 was hijacked. This can result in a predeﬁned
action by the Cloud Management Agent e.g., moving a
hijacked VM into a quarantine environment, alerting the
user and simultaneously starting a fresh instance of VM2
based on its VM image. Thus a reduction of events can
be achieved.
By ordering agents in a hierarchical structure (multiple
simple agents can exists on the same platform e.g., inside
a VM), preprocessing of detected simple events and infor-
mation sharing between logical associated agents leads
to a reduction of network load [41]. Furthermore, this
makes the system more scalable by reducing data sent to
upper system layers. This is introduced and used in [42].
Combining events from system agents (VM agent, host
agent - see Figure 3) and infrastructure monitoring agents
(network agent, ﬁrewall agent) incident detection is not
limited to either host or network based sensors which is
especially important for the characteristics of cloud envi-
ronments. This leads to an increased durability of the
overall incident detection system.
Agent intelligence
An agent’s intelligence is provided by the application
of the Monitor, Analyze, Plan, Execute, Knowledge
(MAPE-K) paradigm developed by IBM [43], which is a
commonly used and accepted design for autonomous sys-
tems. Knowledge comes in the SAaaS approach from a
rule based knowledge, provided by the SBF rules. Moni-
toring is done by simple sensor agents, like the introduced
iNotify agent. Analysis, planning and execution is done via
the Aggregator agent at this current phase of the research
project. Due to the modular design this can be realized
by several, single agents as well. Especially, the execu-
tion of actions dependent on the analysis result will be
implemented as an extra agent, thus can be used indepen-
dently of the underlying event detection (e.g. ﬁle system
change, infrastructure change, etc). One advantage, of this
agent’s intelligence is a reduction of manual user inter-
action. When deploying a new VM, dependend on the
VM template a user has chosen, the SAaaS Agent Man-
agement knows which agents need to be deployed to this
VM. In case a new image gets used, ﬁrst a software inves-
tigation agent gets deployed to the VM, analyzing which
software packages are installed on this particular VM.
Dependend on the results, the SAaaS agent management
knows which agents should be deployed to this VM. The
software analysis part is currently done by checking the
local software package repository on the VM. Further-
more, in the case where agents are already deployed and
actively monitoring, intelligence is applied by a special
Security Business Flow (SBF) rule. In the SAaaS enabled
cloud a user has to deﬁne one or multiple VM Manage-
ment stations. These are basically IP devices, which are
allowed to establish a management connection (e.g. SSH)
to a VM. This prevents the SAaaS agents from send-
ing false-positive events, like in the following scenario:
Given a SAaaS enabled VM with an iNotify-agent already
deployed monitoring ﬁle system changes. When the cloud
user logs into this VM to change some conﬁguration ﬁles,
this gets immediately detected by the iNotify-agent. It
sends these events to the local Aggregator-agent. Instead
of just forwarding the events to the SAaaS event man-
agement system, the Aggregator-agent ﬁrst checks, if an
allowed management connection is established to this
VM. Is this the case, the iNotify events were classiﬁed as
“allowed” not resulting in an alarm. Only a “conﬁguration
changed” message gets forwarded. When the manage-
ment connection is closed again, the Aggregator-agent
notiﬁes the SAaaS Agent Management to automatically
deploy a new Audit agent to validate the security state
of this VM after this conﬁguration change. Thus, agents
act autonomously.
SAaaS architecture components
Figure 3 gives a high level overview how events are gen-
erated, preprocessed, combined and forwarded within the
SAaaS architecture. It can be divided into three logical
layers: input, processing and output layer.
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Figure 3 SAaaS architecture.
Input layer
The SAaaS architecture gets its monitoring information
from distributed agents which are positioned at key points
of the cloud’s infrastructure to detect anomalous activities
in a cloud environment. Possible key points are: running
VMs of cloud users, the VM hosting systems, data storage,
network transition points like virtual switches, hardware
switches, ﬁrewalls, and especially the cloud management
system. A VM agent integrates several monitoring and
policy enforcing tools. Therefore it loads the necessary
VM agent plugins to interact with stand-alone tools like
process monitor, intrusion detection system or anti virus
scanner. It gets installed on a VM likewise on a cloud
host. A logging component is recording the chronological
sequence of occurrences building audit trails.
Processing layer
Each SAaaS agent receives security policies from the
Security Business Flow (SBF) policy modeler component.
Through security policies each agent gets a rule set (its
intelligence) specifying actions in case of a speciﬁc occur-
rence (e.g., modiﬁcation of a freezed conﬁg ﬁle). Thus,
every occurrence gets ﬁrst preprocessed by an agent,
which reduces communication between the VM agent and
the Cloud Management Agent. Self learning algorithms
will be evaluated to improve an agents’ intelligence. The
Security Business Flow policy modeler consists of a pol-
icy editor, a VM security conﬁgurator and a semantic
correlation modeler to enable cloud user to design SBF
and security policies. An example Security Business Flow
aware rule (SBF rule) could be:
In case of a successfully detected rootkit attack on a VM
running on the same cloud as a users VM, the user VM
gets moved to a diﬀerent host to minish the risk of
further damage.
whereas a security policy could state:
In case a modiﬁcation attempt of a ﬁle within
/etc/php5/ gets detected, deny it and send an email to
the cloud administrator.
Security policies get sent from the Security Audit Ser-
vice to the corresponding agents. Using the monitoring
information of the distributes agents in combination with
the SBF rules a cloud behaviour model is built up for
every cloud user. SBF rules are also used as input for
the Cloud Management Agent to detect user overlapping
audit events. Forwarded higher level events are processed
by a complex event processing (CEP) engine. It is also fed
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with the model led business ﬂows from the Business Flow
Modeler to aggregate information and detect behaviour
anomalies. Countermeasures can then be applied to early
detect and prohibit security or privacy breaches. The
Report Generator conditions events, corresponding secu-
rity status as well as audit report results in a human
friendly presentation.
Presentation layer
As a single interaction point to cloud users the Security
Dashboard provides usage proﬁles, trends, anomalies and
cloud instances’ security status (e.g., patch level). Informa-
tion is organized in diﬀerent granular hierarchies depend-
ing on the information detail necessary. At the highest
level a simple three colour indicator informs about a users
cloud services overall status.
Communication between the distributed agents and the
Security Dashboard is handled by an Event Service. Events
will use a standardized message format which is not
deﬁned yet. Our ﬁrst prototype implements the Intrusion
Detection Message Exchange Format (IDMEF) to support
IT forensics. Events are also stored in an Event Archive.
Modelling of business ﬂows
A customers cloud instances always serves a certain busi-
ness case. One major advantage of the SAaaS architecture
will be that its agents are aware of underlying business
process ﬂows. To achieve this a business process ﬂow
model language will be developed. Consider the following
example: Given a typical web application system consist-
ing of a webserver and a database backend deployed at
two VMs in a cloud as depicted in Figure 4. All VMs
are equipped with SAaaS agents. The user’s administrator
installs each VMwith the necessary software, e.g., Apache
webserver and MySQL database.
After the functional conﬁguration of the installed
software is ﬁnished the monitoring conﬁguration gets
designed in form of SBF rules. This can be technical rules,
like allowed user logins, allowed network protocols and
connections between VMs, or that the webserver con-
ﬁguration is ﬁnished and an alarm should be raised if
changes to its conﬁg ﬁles are detected. Furthermore, the
Security Business Flow Language allows to design rules
considering the system’s business ﬂow. For example: if a
request (using the allowed protocols) to the load balancer
or database VM without a preceding service request to
the web application is detected this is rated as an anoma-
lous behaviour which does not occur in a valid business
process ﬂow. Therefore a monitoring event should be gen-
erated. SBF rules need to be modeled by a cloud user who
is aware of its cloud instances and the underlying busi-
ness process. Hence a formal modelling description for
cloud environments needs to be developed. A ﬁrst high
level example of modeled SBF rules is shown in Listing
1. Line 4 - 19 describe possible technical rules, while line
21 - 26 models a business ﬂow rule. In this case a request
to the webserver is only valid if a preceding request was
sent by the load balancer. Line 24 names the SAaaS agents,
which needs to be contacted to resolve this constraint.















8 <src port>80</src port>
9 <src system>
IP of load balancer
</src system>
10 . . .
11 </allowed protocol 1>
12 . . .
13 </running processes 1>
14
15 <freezed conﬁg dir 1>
16 <path>/etc/apache2</path>


















25 . . .
26 </request 1>
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freezed conﬁg dir 1
</origin>
31 <action>email 1</action>
32 . . .
33 </incident alarm 1>
34 . . .
35 </system>
This is a ﬁrst example - applicability of existing process
languages like the Business Process Execution Language
or deﬁnition of a new Security Business Flow Language
is in future work. To reduce complexity a graphical pol-
icy modeler needs to be developed. For typical cloud
usage components e.g., a webserver, proﬁles will be pre-
pared, which models necessary dependencies, like conﬁg
directory, associated processes or used network protocols.
SAaaS agent prototype
For the SAaaS architecture we evaluated existing agent
frameworks with the following requirements:
• Agents can be deployed, moved, updated during
runtime
• Agent performance
• Open Source software platform
• Documentation & community support
Since our cloud environment at HFU’s Cloud Research
Lab CloudIA [44] is build around the cloud management
system OpenNebula another requirement was the agent
programming language: Java. As a result we choose the
Java Agent Development Platform (JADE), which enables
the implementation of multi-agent systems and complies
to FIPAa speciﬁcations. Furthermore, it already provides
a user interface, which alleviates agents creation, deploy-
ment and testing.
Figure 4 illustrates a basic agent architecture we already
assumed in the SAaaS Use Case presented in (Section
Modelling of business ﬂows). It shows three SAaaS VM
agents. Agents live in an agent platform, which provides
them with basic services such as message delivery. A
platform is composed of one or more Containers. Con-
tainers can be executed on diﬀerent hosts thus achiev-
ing a distributed platform. Each container can contain
zero or more agents [41]. To provide monitoring func-
tionality a VM agent interacts through agent plugins
with stand-alone tools, like process monitor, intrusion
Figure 4 Basic SAaaS agent design.
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detection system or anti virus scanner, as depicted in
Figure 4. To harness the potential of cloud computing an
agent can be deployed to a VM on-demand according to
the SBF rules a user deﬁnes. Diﬀerent agents based on
modelled business processes are stored within an agent
repository. To be able to move a JADE agent to a run-
ning cloud instance the Inter Platform Mobility Service
(IPMS) by Cucurull et al. [45] was integrated. This sup-
ports the presented advantage of deploying agents on-
demand if a designed business process ﬂow was started
(as described in (Section How agents can improve inci-
dent detection). Though this implementation is up to
future work.
As a ﬁrst prototype, a two layered agent platform was
developed, capable to deploy two VM agents which will
be deployed and run inside a target VM: 1) iNotify-agent,
b) webserver-agent. A Cloud Management Agent running
as a service at a dedicated VM feeding information to a
Security Dashboard. Regarding the tools feeding simple
events to the two agents only Open Source Linux tools
were considered during our research, since all VMs in
CloudIA are Linux based. For communication between
tool and agent two notiﬁcation mechanisms were imple-
mented: a) the tool sends agent compatible events directly
to the agent plugin; b) the tool writes events in a propri-
etary format into a log ﬁle, which gets parsed by an agent
plugin. As for mechanism a) the ﬁle system monitoring
tool iNotify was used, whereas for mechanism b) parsing
the Apache access log ﬁle (/var/log/apache2/access.log)
was used.
For demo purposes a simple web frontend was written,
which oﬀers to launch several attack scenarios on a VM
agent equipped VM in CloudIA.
First SAaaS demo scenario
In our ﬁrst SAaaS demo we are showing the functional-
ity of the agent framework, its successful integration in
the CloudIA cloud infrastructure, a ﬁrst version of sim-
ple SBF rules combined with a simple message reduction
method. The following attack scenario is addressed: An
attacker is able to successfully login to a target VM via ssh.
Then a malicious ﬁle (e.g. a trojan) gets uploaded to the
web server’s directory. This ﬁle then gets downloaded by a
possible future victim. The chronological sequence of the
demo is shown in Figure 5. It contains three major phases:
1. VM preparation - Deploy of a webserver VM and
assignment of a SBF “webserver” template
2. Attack & detection - VM gets attacked, agents
generate multiple simple events
3. Evaluation - Attack is reported to SAaaS dashboard
VM preparation
First a cloud user deploys a new VM and conﬁgures
it as a webserver (Figure 5, (1)). 5, (1)). After ﬁnishing
the conﬁguration he assigns a predeﬁned SBF template
in Figure 6. This automatically prepares (3) and deploys
(4) an iNotify-agent and a webserver-agent to the running
VM. The iNotify-agent is monitoring changes to the web
servers’ webroot directory, whereas the webserver-agents
Figure 5 Chronological sequence of SAaaS demo1.
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Figure 6 Assignment of SBF webserver template to VM.
compares http-get requests with a list of allowed html
ﬁles of the webroot directory. It also includes a simple
message reduction method for the collector agent stating:
“All simple events occurring within one minute by these
two agents get combined into one ”Webserver attacked -
unknown ﬁle detected“ message”.
Attack detection
An attacker logs in to the VM, uploads a malicious ﬁle to
the VMs webserver root (5a). This then gets downloaded
(5b). This results in three simple events generated by the
corresponding agents:
iNotify-agent: creation of new ﬁle in webserver-root
directory (6), read access of new ﬁle (8)
webserver-agent: download of unknown ﬁle (7).
These three simple events get combined to one
abstracted “Webserver attacked - unknown ﬁle detected”
event by the collector agents due to the simple message
reduction method mentioned above, and sent out (9) to
the Security Dashboard.
User notiﬁcation
All events get saved into an event archive and forwarded
to SAaaS CEP engine (10). The user gets informed (11)
via a ﬁrst prototype version of the Security Dashboard,
depicted in Figure 7. It shows the VM’s state before an
attack. After launching an attack, the Security Dashboard
indicator light changes its colour and provides a short
information about the monitored event (Figure 7). The
impact of an monitored event is deﬁned in a simple sever-
ity matrix, as described in Table 1. Each severity value
out of the webserver log ﬁle gets associated with a certain
score. This score gets added for all messages. Then the
quotient gets calculated which is directly connected to the
resulting colour.
Security relevant anomaly detection through
behavior analysis
To detect unforseen events, the system’s behavior is con-
stantly monitored and analyzed. Therefore it processes
the events from each of the agents for enabling anoma-
lous behavior detection. As described by Lui et. al in [31]
agents with diﬀerent anomaly detection algorithms are
used to achieve a better detection rate.
To determine, which anomaly detection algorithms are
suited best, an evaluation has to be done. The algorithms
considered includemachine learning approaches like neu-
ral networks or Markov models, statistical methods, out-
lier detection and some specialised algorithms [20-22].
This evaluation is part of current work therefore no ﬁnal
result is given here.
Generally, two methods to train a system exist: super-
vised learning where data is manually tagged as ’normal’ or
’anomalous’ and unsupervised learning where the detec-
tion system itself has to evaluate which data is normal and
which is not. The latter is achieved for example by looking
for extreme values in diﬀerent key indicators.
To achieve an eﬀective anomaly detection Winter et
al. claim [46] that it is crucial that the types of events
to be detected are deﬁned in advance and the system is
Figure 7 Cloud security dashboard prototype before and after detected attack.
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Table 1 Severity matrix for simple security indicator light
Severity Value of message Quotient Colour
info 0 < 1.4 green
low 1 <= 1.4 green
middle 2 > 1.4 < 2.5 yellow
high 7 >= 2.6 red
designed and conﬁgured accordingly. Therefore, we ﬁrst
determine which cloud speciﬁc security threats can be
detected by anomaly detection. After that, we analyse
which key factors have to be processed.
At the current state, we have identiﬁed the anomaly
types to be detected. Some of these issues have already
brieﬂy been described in (Section Cloud speciﬁc security
issues in focus) but are now presented in a more detailed
manner.
Detection of accountmisuse
Account misuse is a well known problem from the area
of web application and thus also aﬀects the cloud’s man-
agement web interface. An attacker can gain access to
a victim’s account by diﬀerent means like hacking weak
user credentials or exploiting security ﬂaws present in the
application [47].
In cloud computing however access to an account does
not only grant access to the victim’s data but also to
the data hosted on services which run under the victim’s
account and thereby potentially to data of many service
users. Additionally the attacker could spawn multiple new
cloud instances, using them for his own malicious intents
and thus ﬁnancially damaging the victim as he has to pay
for the instances. By bringing down the victim’s services
an attacker could potentially cause even more damage.
Monitoring the user’s behaviour for anomalies can help
detecting account misuse. For example heavy activity on
a rather silent account would cause suspicion, especially
if the login sourced from another country or continent.
Additionally to the VM count and geographical login
source, the weekday, daytime as well as usage of available
VM types gets monitored.
Detection of distributed denial of service attacks
A cloud infrastructure can run a huge number of sys-
tems, maintained by diﬀerent cloud users resulting in a
heterogeneous level of security conﬁguration. This is very
attractive for misuse. A traditional SSH bruteforce attack
tried numerous combinations of username:password cou-
ples on one target IP. Detection is fairly simple since this
behaviour results in massive “login denied” messages in
the SSH server’s log ﬁle. Therefore modern SSH brute-
force attacks are carried out by compromised comput-
ers of a botnet (bots) which just try one or two user-
name:password combinations at a speciﬁc target and then
move on to a next one, depicted in Figure 8. Especially
huge cloud infrastructures are very attractive targets to
this attack, since all systems normally are within one
IP range. If one vulnerable system was found (malicious
ssh login was successful) this can compromise the whole
cloud security state. This attack attempt mostly stays
undetected in traditional host based monitoring systems.
Bymonitoring the login attempts cloudwide overmultiple
cloud customer instances, a successful ssh login with pre-
ceding unsuccessful ssh login attempts at diﬀerent cloud
instances can be deﬁned as anomalous behaviour and thus
detected.
Detection of VM breakout
Several hypervisor vulnerabilities have been found in the
past that allow an attacker to gain access to a cloud host
from inside a VM (e.g. [48,49]) As cloud computing and
especially IaaS relies heavily on virtualization technologies
this poses a thread to every cloud provider.
By accessing the underlying host, an attacker not only
gains access to real hardware but also to all other VMs
running on this machine. It is therefore essential that
VM escaping attacks get detected and appropriate counter
measures are taken. This includes monitoring process
activity on all cloud hosts for unusual activity, for example
Figure 8 SSH bruteforce by botnet.
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the commands that are being executed or syscalls as
described by Hofmeyr et al. in [50].
Detection of cloud resourcemisusage
Scenario A - The possibility to quickly aggregate massive
loads of computing power is very attractive. This is also
true for criminals who can use this power for example to
crack hashed passwords or decode CAPTCHAs. Techni-
cally there is however no non-intrusive way to decide for
what exactly cloud computing power is used. Even if there
was, data protection laws and credibility concerns prevent
such monitoring.
One possibility to encounter misuse is to thoroughly
check credit card or other payment data as most criminals
wouldn’t want to pay for themselves if other means such
as stolen credit cards exist.
Scenario B - The cloud’s computing power can also be
used to carry out attacks on other targets. One possibility
is to aggregate many VMs and use them to DDoS a single
target and thereby preventing others to use its services. To
detect such attacks, the network has to be monitored for
anomalous activity especially from the inside. Due to the
distributed nature of cloud computing information about
network ﬂow has to be collected at many diﬀerent physical
locations. To get the whole picture however, this data has
to be analysed in the overall context.
An example scenario is depicted in Figure 9:
An attacker creates only a few number of instances in
each of the cloud’s data centers. Then he uses all of these
world wide distributed instances to DDoS a victim’s host.
This host can be anywhere on the internet. If only the
data in each data center was analysed for its own, maybe
no attack would be detected as only a few number of
hosts take part in it. If however, send the data to a cen-
tralized/distributed detection system, we can detect the
attack at its whole extent.
Attacks on cloud services
To detect attacks on a user’s services, behaviour proﬁles
are generated for his systems. The SBF rules described
above provide a basis for such a proﬁle. However, addi-
tional properties like the VMs’ CPU and memory usage
can also be taken into account. These indicators are also
combined as for example an attack could cause heavy
CPU load but minor network load whereas for normal
requests these values increase together. To detect the
introduced anomalies the following key indicators have
been identiﬁed:
• Account activity: VM count, VM type usage,
geographical login source, weekday and daytime.
• Host monitoring: running processes, syscalls, user
authentication
• Network monitoring: source and destination address
and port, number of active connections per
source/destination, duration of these connections,
number of new connections in the last x seconds per
source/destination, number of packets for each
source/destination, number of bytes transferred per
source/destination
Figure 9 DDoS Attack Scenario.
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• VM-Monitoring: CPU load, memory usage,
hypercalls, VM scaling behaviour
The next step is to deﬁne these indicatorsmore precisely
and to ﬁnd the best algorithms for each of the presented
scenarios.
Automated security business role generation
Furthermore, behaviour analysis is to be used to support
the deﬁnition of Security Business Flow rules and there-
fore the deployment of agents to a customers VM. By
detecting which VM templates a user chooses and which
software gets installed into a VM, the underlying business
case gets detected. This could be a typical three tier archi-
tecture in a distributed environment, such as a web server
VM (presentation tier), load balancer VM (logic tier) and
database VM (data tier). This detection then results in
the automated generation of SBF rules, such as allowed
communication paths, validity of scalability commands or
technical rules, like ﬁrewall rules or allowed protocols. A
validity of scalability could be that, a high demand at the
presentation tier, e.g. online shop fronted is necessary to
qualify a scalability command of database VMs. The auto-
mated generation of SBF rules will support the presented
SAaaS architecture and use cases. It is necessary for an
automated detection, of which agents are necessary on a
customers’ cloud resources. This saves a huge amount of
human work in the deﬁnition of security rules, which is a
drawback of current incident detection systems.
Framework evaluation
In this section we ﬁrst evaluate the usage of autonomous
agents for the SAaaS architecture. We then discuss sce-
narios to show how the SAaaS architecture addresses the
introduced cloud security issues presented in (Section
Cloud speciﬁc security issues in focus).
Evaluation of the SAaaS architecture
Agent performance
It is essential for the SAaaS architecture that the agents
are very eﬃcient not causing a high oﬀset of resource con-
sumption. For our ﬁrst prototype we want to show the
overhead introduced to the cloud VMs by the JADE plat-
form, how fast agents can be deployed to a VM in runtime
and second how fast the agent communication is. All tests
were done at the university’s research cloud infrastructure
CloudIA. Hardware of machines hosting the VMs was:
8x CPU: Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5504 @ 2.00GHz 64-bit
architecture, 12 GB of memory and 1 Gigabit Ethernet.
Each VM was assigned with 512 MB RAM, 274 MB Swap,
1 CPU and 4GB HDD local storage. Each test was per-
formed at least 10 times, average values are presented in
the following.
Overhead JADE platform
First, the introduced overhead by the JADE platform
was tested. E.Cortese et al. show in [51] that running the
platform is not introducing a high CPU overhead. Addi-
tionally we measured how the boot process of a VM gets
delayed because the JADE platform needs to be started.
BootChart [52] was used to analyze overhead and it can
be conﬁrmed, that in worse case the JADE platform adds
2s to the total boot time of a VM of 15s. For the presented
usage scenario this is totally acceptable.
Agent deploy time
Second, the time was tested it takes to create, conﬁg-
ure and deploy an agent to a new platform. Therefore we
introduced 5 measure times: t0 - agent gets created, t1
- agent gets started at the Agent Management VM, t2 -
agent loaded its conﬁguration, t3 - agent got transferred
to target VM, t4 - agent starts working on target VM.
The test was done ﬁrst using no connection security for
transferring the agents (MTPHTTP). Second a secure and
authenticated channel between platforms was used (MTP
HTTPS) to see how much impact secure communication
introduces. Figure 10a conﬁrms that in average it only
takes 180ms for a full deploy of an agent usingMTPHTTP
and 350ms using MTP HTTPS. This proves the applica-
bility of the JADE agent platform to support the presented
SAaaS use case. Though further investigation needs to be
done to clarify the MTP HTTPS overhead in detail.
Agent message time
Third, the agent message performance was tested. The
roundtrip time of a variable amount of message with a
variable payload (stringlength of event message) between
two agents was measured. As a constraint a maximum
roundtrip time of 1s was set. Figure 10b shows, that with
the JADE agents we are able to send more than 500 mes-
sages with a maximum payload of 10.000 characters at
once before we hit the deﬁned constraint. So far this is
acceptable for the introduced SAaaS scenario.
These tests show the time performance of single agents.
Especially in the given cloud scenario scalability of the
proposed system is from high interest. To prove this, scal-
ability test with diﬀerent number of VMs and agents (10,
50, 100, ...) are developed right now. These tests were not
ﬁnished by the time of this manuscript. Nevertheless, to
make the results available to the readers of this journal
they will be available online as a tech report at the SAaaS
project website [53].
Message reduction by business ﬂow awareness
In case of a monitoring event is produced it ﬁrst will
be processed by the SAaaS agent, which is initiating the
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Figure 10 Performance tests of SAaaS agent performance. (a) Agent deploy time (b) Agent message roundtrip time.
event. Afterwards this agent informs all other agents
which are also involved in the current business case
(agent group). This is important to reduce the overall
messages sent to the cloud event processing system espe-
cially in large cloud computing environments. Imagine
an expected high load on the load balancer can result
in a high number of events produced by the load bal-
ancer’s agent. Since the events are expected they again
result in a high load on the webserver and the database
whose corresponding agents could produce again a high
number of events. By informing the business ﬂow par-
ticipating agents (webserver agent, database agent) with
an abstract message (e.g., 100 expected events registered)
false positive event messages will be prevented.
Cloudwide incident detection
Furthermore, abstracted business ﬂow events are dis-
tributed to a cloud infrastructure monitoring agent. This
could be a started web shop request at customer Bob’sweb
server from Src-IP 1.2.3.4. A more abstracted event gets
sent to the cloud event processing system (CEP engine)
to detect (possible) user overlapping security incidences.
This could be the number of not completed web shop
transactions originated by SRC-IP 1.2.3.4 to predetect a
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Denial of Service attack. If the CEP engine classiﬁes a
behaviour as anomalous certain actions can be executed,
like warning the cloud provider’s Computer Emergency
Response Team, adjusting ﬁrewall settings or informing
the cloud customer’s admin.
How SAaaS addresses the cloud security issues
1) Monitoring of cloud instances User VMs running in
a cloud infrastructure are equipped with SAaaS
agents. The user utilizes a Security Business Flow
Language describing which VM components are to
be monitored, which behaviour of this VM is
considered “normal” and how to alert in case of
system security suspicion e.g., open network
connection without a preceding legitimate request.
The status gets conditioned in a user friendly format
in a web portal - the SAaaS security dashboard.
Continuous monitoring creates transparency about
the security status of a user’s cloud instances hence
increasing the user’s trust into the cloud
environment. This addresses the cloud security
problem 2) Missing security monitoring in cloud
infrastructure and mitigates problem 3) Defective
isolation of shared resources presented in (Section
Cloud speciﬁc security issues in focus).
2) Environment awareness of cloud instances One
reason of using a cloud infrastructure is to beneﬁt
from its scalability attributes. In this context it is
most often used to deal with usage peeks, for
example if a new version of a software gets released
and huge download requests are expected.
Characteristic to peeks is that they are mostly
foreseeable and limited to a certain time frame.
Therefore cloud user design their cloud application
to start new instances if a certain threshold is
reached to provide service availability. This results in
two challenges for cloud security:
2.1) IaaS upscaling - business driven Since a
user’s infrastructure can change rapidly
(grow, shrink) in case of a peek scenario the
incident detection system needs to be aware
of the peek situation and the deﬁned
scalability thresholds. Thus, false positive
incident alarms can be avoided if service
requests due to newly created VM instances
get detected. The monitoring system is aware
of the changing infrastructure.
2.2) IaaS upscaling - attacker driven Most of the
time scalability thresholds, like “maximum
number new VMs to be created” get deﬁned
once. Mostly during the design phase for the
ﬁrst peek event. If the peek was managed well
by the thresholds they just stay, like deﬁned,
although they might be not needed anymore
(e.g., until the next software release). This
enables a new cloud speciﬁc attack: Financial
damage due to nefarious abuse of cloud
resources. Attacker can cause the creation of
new cloud instances up to the scalability
threshold by creating a huge number of
allowed requests, which do not result in any
successful business case e.g., distribution of
malicious software. A cloud monitoring
needs to be aware of business processes to
detect an event of possible misuse of cloud
scalability. By enhancing agents with
environment awareness cloud security
problem 1) Abuse of cloud resources and 2)
Missing security monitoring in cloud
infrastructure are addressed by the SAaaS
incident detection architecture.
3.) Cloud infrastructure monitoring and audit With the
presented SAaaS the security state of the entire cloud
environment, especially the cloud management
system will be monitored. Of interest are customer
data and data path, administrative actions concerning
customer’s instances (e.g., patch management),
incident response time, backup restore time, etc. .
This way cross-customer monitoring is used by the
cloud provider as well as a 3rd parties, like a security
service provider to ensure the overall cloud security
state. Standardized interfaces enable security audits
of a cloud infrastructure, which can lead to a cloud
security certiﬁcation. This addresses the presented
cloud security problem 2) Missing security
monitoring in cloud infrastructure and helps to bring
assessable security features to cloud computing.
Conclusion and future work
In this paper, we introduced cloud speciﬁc security prob-
lems and the Security Audit as a Service incident detection
system, which aims to solve them. To mitigate the short-
comings of traditional intrusion detection systems we
showed the advantages of using autonomous agents as a
source for sensor information.We explained how incident
detection in clouds can be enhanced by adding business
ﬂow information to the presented agents. Business ﬂows
correlated with monitoring conﬁguration can be mod-
eled by the introduced Security Service Level Agreements.
A ﬁrst meta model was shown. Since SAaaS agents can
be moved business ﬂow dependent to cloud instances
during runtime the system acknowledges a cloud ﬂexi-
bility and scalability advantages. It has been shown in
several examples, that behaviour monitoring can detect
cross customer incidents, which for example can help to
limit Denial of Service attacks. An evaluation showed that
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the selected agent framework is lightweight enough to
support a cloud’s changing infrastructure and how the
SAaaS architecture addresses the presented cloud speciﬁc
security problems.
As for future work, we identiﬁed the following tasks: a)
comprehensive research in anomaly detection algorithms,
b) comprehensive research in complex event processing,
c) development of the SSLA policy modeler, d) develop-
ment of SAaaS agents.
Additionally, to reduce network load and to avoid event
storms the event data could be compressed before send-
ing. This can be done using standard compression algo-
rithms or to gain even higher compression ratios, by
aggregating and preprocessing the data to create higher
level information (e.g. information about the amount of
connections of each host in the last x minutes). Research
has to be done how this can be eﬃciently achieved for
diﬀerent types of data.
Endnote
a IEEE Computer Society standards organization for
agent-based technology and its interoperability with other
technologies.
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